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Abstract 
Sanctions are frequently applied by the UN Security Council (UNSC) as well as regional organizations. While the 
objectives sought often vary, a frequent commonality is that they target African states. Indeed, Africa is the most 
frequently targeted continent by the UNSC and regional organisations including the African Union, Economic 
Community of West African States and the European Union. However, little attention has been paid to the 
confluence of this sanctions activity by these different organizations. This article seeks to address this gap in the 
research. While the UNSC continues to focus on sanctioning to end hostilities, the regional organizations have 
assigned themselves unconstitutional changes to government as the principal reason to sanction African states. 
Drawing on data from the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC), this article suggests that: 1) regional 
organisations are leading UNSC activity more often than is appreciated in the literature; 2) the UNSC has of late 
been expanding its sanctioning activity to consider issues of democracy and good governance; 3) the UNSC uses 
sanctions to endorse the activity of African regional organizations to deal with crises on the continent; and 4) 
UNSC and regional sanctions are intimately tied to crisis management in Africa. 
 
 
Africa is the continent most targeted by sanctions. During the Cold War, when the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) was all but paralysed, the only sanctions regimes that the UN imposed were directed at countries 
located on the African continent: Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, penalized for their apartheid regimes. In 
the post-Cold War era, Africa has continued to register the highest frequency of sanctions, applied not only by the 
UN but by other organizations as well. Africa's own regional bodies, such as the African Union (AU) and the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), are active in wielding sanctions against their 
members;1 and about half of the sanctions imposed by the EU are levied against African targets.2 Africa, then, 
represents the point of confluence of the sanctions practice not only of the UN, but of at least three diverse 
regional organizations, and consequently registers the highest frequency of sanctions worldwide. 
While the decisions by members of the various organizations are motivated by a desire to remedy instability in 
this troubled continent, the four organizations administering them base their respective sanctions activities on very 
different legal foundations. The UN Charter confers upon the UNSC ‘primary responsibility’ for the maintenance 
of international peace and security,3 and endows it with the power to impose mandatory measures, including or 
excluding military force.4 The Charter also foresees a role for regional organizations, which are expected to 
manage security crises in their respective regions using all means except for military force.5 This explicitly 
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security-related sanctions practice is complemented by measures motivated by other objectives. In recent years, 
some regional organizations have given themselves a mandate to promote democracy. African organizations, 
including the AU and ECOWAS, have embraced provisions that mandate sanctions in response to 
unconstitutional power transfers within member states. Finally, the EU has acquired a role in championing 
democracy beyond its borders which it does through two primary channels. First, it enacts foreign policy 
sanctions; second, it has inserted conditionality clauses in its agreements with third countries permitting the 
suspension of those agreements in cases of grave and persistent breaches of human rights, the rule of law or 
democratic principles.6 As a result, the sanctions practice of regional organizations combines activity in conflict 
management, as envisaged in the UN Charter, and the additional role of supporting democracy.7 
How has this apparent allocation of tasks between the global and the regional level played out in practice? This 
article examines the relationship between sanctions mandated by the UNSC and sanctions adopted by regional 
organizations against African targets.8 We proceed inductively in an attempt to map the interactions between the 
two sets of sanctions. Exploring this interplay is of particular interest in the case of Africa because regional 
organizations, on the one hand, are expected to deal with security crises in accordance with the UN Charter, and 
on the other hand, have acquired a role in the promotion of democratic rule. How do these practices interact, if at 
all? We explore the interfaces between (a) the objectives of conflict resolution and democracy promotion; (b) the 
global and the regional level; and (c) an exogenous body (the EU) and two indigenous regional organizations (the 
AU and ECOWAS) sharing similar objectives. 
We examine these questions by looking at the evidence collected by the UN Targeted Sanctions Consortium 
(TSC),9 the result of a joint effort undertaken by a network of sanctions scholars and professionals. Data from the 
TSC cover UN targeted sanctions applied between 1991 and 2013. The data are particularly suitable for our 
purposes because they cover the concurrent presence of sanctions measures by regional organizations alongside 
UN measures.10 TSC data are complemented here by data on sanctions of regional organizations independently 
compiled by the authors. 
We begin by outlining the mandate of the UNSC and situating its African sanctions in the broader framework of 
the global organization's peace and security role, using the TSC data to identify the features that inform Africa's 
profile as a target of global sanctions. We then turn in the second section to look at the sanctions practice of 
regional organizations. In the third section we discuss and interpret the patterns identified, laying out their policy 
implications. The article concludes with some final reflections on African sanctions as a nexus of global and 
regional governance. 
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UN sanctions in Africa: a profile 
Most UNSC sanctions are imposed in Africa: 43 (68 per cent) of the 63 UNSC sanctions ‘episodes’ studied by the 
TSC were applied against African states.11 Only 20 episodes (32 per cent) of UN sanctions during the period 
covered by the TSC dealt with non-African states or with terrorist groups. The latter were spread around the 
world: they involved only one European state (the former Yugoslavia), one Caribbean state (Haiti) and one Asian 
state (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, DPRK); the remaining episodes concerned Middle Eastern 
countries—Iran, Iraq, Lebanon—and individuals and entities connected to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. 
The 43 sanctions episodes in Africa related to 13 different target states.12 Several characteristics set the African 
episodes apart from the rest of UN sanctions practice. Conspicuously, they tend to be the subject of UN sanctions 
for multiple episodes, which equates to many years under sanctions: the cases of Liberia, Angola, Sierra Leone, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Côte d'Ivoire each encompass at least four or five separate 
episodes, each episode representing modifications in the objectives of sanctions and/or the nature of the measures 
employed. In contrast, outside Africa only Iran and the Al-Qaeda/Taliban sanctions feature as many as four 
episodes. Judging from the number of episodes, then, attention to African targets by the UNSC tends to be 
sustained. 
In terms of the specific targets, eleven of the 43 African episodes, or 26 per cent, targeted rebel factions. This is in 
stark contrast to non-African sanctions, in which only three episodes out of 20 (15 per cent) were directed against 
rebel groups. The second most frequent target of UNSC sanctions against African states is the entire government 
and associated entities, representing nine of 43 episodes (21 per cent). A further six episodes target only the top 
government leadership, for example cabinet ministers. This means that in roughly 35 per cent of the African 
sanctions episodes, either the whole government, or a portion of it, is targeted. Coincidentally, this is the same 
percentage of episodes of non-African sanctions in which the government was targeted. In only two episodes 
outside Africa, however, did UN sanctions target all of the parties to a conflict, while this was the case in seven 
episodes in Africa. 
Who are the initiators of sanctions regimes at the UNSC? Resolutions can admit multiple ‘pens’; in only five of 
the African episodes was a non-permanent member the primary drafter of the sanctions resolution.13 Resolutions 
applying sanctions against Africa were drafted by Portugal, a former colonial power; by Latin American states—
Chile and Honduras; and by fellow African countries—Botswana, Egypt and Guinea-Bissau. Given the colonial 
record of the United Kingdom and France in Africa, and their status as permanent members of the Security 
Council, it is not surprising that they too appear as the primary instigators of sanctions. In twelve of the 43 
African episodes, the sanctions resolutions were drafted by France; these concerned predominantly francophone 
states—Rwanda, the Central African Republic (CAR), the DRC and Côte d'Ivoire—but also Libya 2.14 In seven 
episodes, resolutions were tabled by the UK: these involved sanctions against Sierra Leone, Somalia and Libya 1. 
4 
 
The United States was involved in the drafting of 15 of the sanctions episodes: all but those against Côte d'Ivoire, 
DRC, Libya 2, Rwanda, Sudan 1 and Guinea-Bissau. Indeed, Washington often holds the primary ‘pen’ of UNSC 
resolutions: resolutions giving rise to 31 of all sanctions episodes (49 per cent) were drafted by the United States. 
It was also one of the primary authors, alongside France and the UK, of the sanctions resolutions against Libya 1 
and the CAR. Moscow is less involved: Russia was one of the drafters in just three cases: for sanctions against 
Angola, Ethiopia/Eritrea and Libya 2. China did not participate in drafting any of the UNSC sanctions episodes 
save the latest against the DPRK—and even then, the United States was the primary pen of the measures applied. 
 
What are the objectives of UNSC sanctions in Africa? 
The UNSC's authority to apply sanctions stems from Chapter VII of the UN Charter, according to which ‘a threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression’15 may serve as a trigger for coercive measures, including 
sanctions and the use of force. While other situations may also constitute grounds for the application of 
mandatory sanctions, the crisis must be perceived to be sufficiently significant for the imposition of sanctions to 
garner the support of at least nine members of the Security Council without attracting the veto of any of the five 
permanent members. 
Our data confirm that UN sanctions in Africa are typically motivated by peace and security concerns, as 
anticipated by the Charter's mandate. If we look at the 16 cases of sanctions applied by the UNSC against African 
states, eleven (69 per cent) addressed a civil war of some kind: in Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Liberia, Libya 2, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan (Darfur), CAR and South Sudan. Two sanctions regimes were applied in 
response to interstate conflicts (between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and between Eritrea and Somalia), two concerned 
state sponsors of terrorism (Libya 1 and Sudan 1) and one of the more recent episodes, against Guinea-Bissau, is 
the only one to address, exclusively, an unconstitutional change in government. 
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Table 1. UN targeted sanctions in Africa 
State targeted Dates UN sanctions applied UN sanctions' primary objective 
 
Angola 1993–2002 Cease hostilities 
Central African Republic 2013 (ongoing) Cease hostilities/democracy support 
Côte d'Ivoire 2004 (ongoing) Cease hostilities/democracy support 
Democratic Republic of Congo 2004 ongoing Cease hostilities 
Ethiopia/Eritrea 1999–2001 Cease hostilities 
Guinea-Bissau 2012 (ongoing) Democracy support 
Liberia 2003 (ongoing) Cease hostilities/democracy support 
Libya 1 1992–2003 Counterterrorism 
Libya 2 2011 (ongoing) R2P 
Rwanda 1994–2008 Cease hostilities 
Sierra Leone 1997–2010 Cease hostilities 
Somalia 1992 (ongoing) Cease hostilities 
Somalia/Eritrea 2009 (ongoing) Cease hostilities 
South Sudana 2015 (ongoing) Cease hostilities 
Sudan 1 1996–2001 Counterterrorism 
Sudan 2 (Darfur) 2005 (ongoing) Cease hostilities 
Total 16   
a South Sudan is the only case not included in the TSC. 
 
The UNSC's strong focus on conflict management in Africa contrasts with the application of sanctions in pursuit 
of more diverse goals elsewhere. The TSC data classify episodes by their primary objective, while acknowledging 
that additional objectives might also be in play. This allows us to explore how primary objectives differ between 
measures applied against targets located in Africa and those applied to targets outside Africa. If one looks at the 
primary objective outlined by the UNSC for the imposition of sanctions, there is a stark contrast between the two 
groups of cases. Of the African sanctions, the vast majority, 32 of 43 episodes (74 per cent), list armed 
conflict/cessation of hostilities as the primary objective. In five of the episodes (Libya 1 and Sudan 1), 
counterterrorism was the primary objective. In three episodes, corresponding to the cases of Sierra Leone, Côte 
d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau, the chief aim was to support democracy. A single episode in Libya 2 pursued the 
objective of shielding civilian populations from armed violence under the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine. 
And finally, Liberia features one episode focusing on good governance as the primary objective of the UNSC 
sanctions.16 In contrast, in only five out of 20 episodes (25 per cent) of UNSC sanctions against non-African 
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targets was the primary objective ending armed conflict (FRY 1 and 2, Iraq 1 and 2, and Taliban). The primary 
objective in other cases outside Africa was non-proliferation (in seven of the episodes against Iran and North 
Korea), counterterrorism (four episodes all dealing with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban) or (one episode in Lebanon) 
support for an international criminal process. 
 
The sanctions activity of regional organizations in Africa 
While the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security rests with the UNSC, 
regional and subregional organizations are also expected to play a role. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter states that 
member states should ‘make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional 
arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council’.17 These provisions 
suggest that the relationship between the UN and regional organizations was intended to be governed by the 
principle of complementarity, whereby the UNSC would intervene only in those matters which regional 
arrangements proved unable to resolve. Chapter VIII further stipulates that the ‘UNSC shall, where appropriate, 
utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority’.18 
Beyond this mandate laid down by the UN Charter, regional organizations have given themselves a role in 
championing democracy. For African regional organizations, the trigger to apply sanctions is usually an 
unconstitutional change of government. Through the adoption of charters, constitutions and protocols that call for 
sanctions mainly in the form of suspension of membership, the African regional organizations have espoused a 
common goal of promoting good governance and democracy by responding to coups d'état in the hope of 
deterring future occurrences. Thus, rather than tackling many different types of conflict via the application of 
sanctions, as the UNSC does, the AU and ECOWAS have focused on responding to unconstitutional changes of 
government. The EU, an external organization representing a region intimately linked to Africa, has adopted a 
similar role. 
The African Union 
The AU's precursor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), was founded in 1963 as a pan-African 
arrangement against the background of decolonization and anti-apartheid struggle.19 In 2001, the AU replaced the 
OAU in order to accelerate the process of integration in the continent. Like the UN, the AU has a body dedicated 
to the ‘prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts’, the Peace and Security Council (PSC). 
Currently, the AU—representing all but one of 54 African states (the sole exception being Morocco)—supports 
two of the largest peacekeeping missions in the world: the African mission in DRC and the UN–AU hybrid 
mission in Darfur. One of the principles of the AU is to ‘promote democratic principles and institutions, popular 
participation and good governance’.20 Although the 2000 Lomé Declaration for an OAU Response to 
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Unconstitutional Changes of Government is often cited as a justification for sanctions, the authorization to apply 
these measures is enshrined in the AU Constitutive Act, whose Article 30 is the main trigger for such action.21 It 
stipulates that: ‘Governments which shall come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to 
participate in the activities of the Union.’ Also, Article 23, entitled ‘Imposition of sanctions’, reads: ‘Any Member 
State that fails to comply with the decisions and policies of the Union may be subjected to other sanctions, such as 
the denial of transport and communications links with other Member States, and other measures of a political and 
economic nature to be determined by the Assembly.’ Since 2001 the AU has applied 15 sanctions regimes against 
twelve states, as shown in table 2. 
Table 2. AU versus UN targeted sanctions 
State targeted 
Dates of unconstitutional change 
of government 
AU 
sanctions 
UN sanctions also applied, and 
when 
Central African Republic 2003 Yes None 
Central African Republic 2013 Yes 2013 (ongoing) 
Comoros 2007 Yes None 
Côte d'Ivoire 2010 Yes 2004 (ongoing) 
Egypt 2011 Yes None 
Guinea-Bissau 2008–09 Yes None 
Guinea-Bissau 2012 Yes 2012 (ongoing) 
Guinea-Conakry 2008 Yes None 
Libya 2 None Yes 2011 (ongoing) 
Madagascar 2009 Yes None 
Mali 2012 Yes None 
Mauritania 2005 Yes None 
Mauritania 2008 Yes None 
Niger 2010 Yes None 
Togo 2005 Yes None 
Total   15 4 
 
The Economic Community of West African States 
ECOWAS was founded in 1975 in an attempt to improve and foster economic cooperation among the 15 member 
states. In 1991, it adopted a Declaration of Political Principles ‘to encourage and promote in each [of] our 
countries political pluralism’.22 This marked the start of a growing focus on the governance of member states.23  
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In 2001, ECOWAS adopted a protocol that prescribed how elections should be organized and monitored. 
Importantly, it was agreed that sanctions would be applied in the event of an ‘abrupt end to democracy’ or 
‘massive violation of human rights in a Member State’.24 The ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good 
Governance stipulated consequences, including the suspension of the errant member state from all ECOWAS 
decision-making bodies.25 Lesser sanctions are also contemplated, such as the refusal to support candidates 
presented by the member state for elective posts in international organizations and the refusal to organize 
ECOWAS meetings in the member state concerned. Over the years, ECOWAS has established a well-deserved 
reputation for reacting to conflicts before the UNSC:26 in August 1990, for example, well before former UN 
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali penned his Agenda for peace in 1992, ECOWAS had already launched 
an intervention in Monrovia.27 Since 1990, ECOWAS has applied a total of eight sanctions regimes against seven 
of its members, all of them for unconstitutional changes to government; thus, nearly half of its members have 
been subject to sanctions. Beyond suspending membership of countries at fault, ECOWAS has sometimes enacted 
more far-reaching sanctions, exemplified in its petroleum and arms embargo against Sierra Leone in 1997.28 By 
contrast, provisions for intervention in the event of massive human rights abuses have yet to be invoked. 
Table 3. ECOWAS versus UN targeted sanctions 
State targeted 
Dates UN sanctions 
applied 
Dates of unconstitutional change of 
government 
ECOWAS 
sanctions 
Côte d'Ivoire 2004 (ongoing) 
2010 Yes 
Guinea-Bissau None 
2008–09 Yes 
Guinea-Bissau 2012 (ongoing) 
2012 Yes 
Guinea-
Conakry 
None 
2008 Yes 
Mali None 
2012 Yes 
Niger None 
2010 Yes 
Sierra Leone 1997–2010 
1997 Yes 
Togo None 
2005 Yes 
Total 3 
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The European Union 
The EU differs from most regional organizations in that it has given itself a mandate to impose sanctions against 
states outside its boundaries. Originating in the decade that followed the Second World War as an integration 
project by six states persuaded that economic unification would prevent future wars, it gradually acquired a 
foreign policy role.29 After the end of the Cold War, this role was institutionalized in the form of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), launched in 1992. The CFSP's principles and objectives are set out in the 
constitutive treaty of the Union, which has been revised on several occasions: according to their present 
formulation in Article 21 of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, they include commitments to ‘safeguard the EU's values, 
fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity’; ‘consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and the principles of international law’; and ‘preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen 
international security’.30 The same article defines EU values as ‘democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the 
principles of the United Nations Charter and international law’. Thus the protection of democracy appears twice 
in the article that outlines the self-mandated mission of the EU in international relations. In its first document on 
sanctions policy, the EU announced that it would impose sanctions ‘to uphold respect for human rights, 
democracy, the rule of law and good governance’.31 This said, EU sanctions practice is not confined to measures 
adopted under the CFSP.32 In the mid-1990s, the EU also introduced a conditionality clause in its relations with 
third countries which allowed for suspension of cooperation agreements in response to grave violations of rule of 
law, human rights and democratic standards. In practice, the justifications adduced by the EU for the imposition 
of sanctions almost invariably invoke democracy along with human rights and good governance. Indeed, the sort 
of human rights violations to which the EU responds with sanctions, such as breaches of the freedom of 
association, the freedom of speech and the freedom of demonstration, are intimately intertwined with the 
democratic process.33 The salience of democracy in EU sanctions decisions may be attributable to a desire to 
enhance the legitimacy of the measures by presenting the wrongdoing as contravening universally agreed norms 
rather than typically western standards. 
The EU treaty features a clause that allows for the temporary suspension of membership rights when a member 
violates the organization's values (summarized above).34 However, this clause has never been activated.35 The key 
difference between the sanctions practice of the EU and that of African regional organizations—that it levies 
sanctions against outside states rather than its own members—is a matter of policy choice, not the absence of the 
relevant provisions. 
The EU has applied 22 sanctions regimes against 19 African states in the period under study, as shown in table 4. 
These include both sanctions levied under the CFSP and suspensions from the benefits associated with the 
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Cotonou Agreement, which governs the EU's relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. 
While most sanctions regimes fall into the latter category,36 some countries have been subject to both suspension 
from the Cotonou Agreement and CFSP sanctions; these include Zimbabwe, Guinea-Conakry and the Comoros. 
 
Table 4. EU versus UN targeted sanctions 
State targeted Dates UN sanctions applied 
Dates of unconstitutional 
change of government 
EU sanctions 
Central African Republic None 2003 Yes 
Central African Republic 2013 (ongoing) 2013 Yes 
Comoros None 1999 Yes 
Comoros None 2007 Yes 
Côte d'Ivoire 2004 (ongoing) 2010 Yes 
Democratic Republic of Congo 2004 (ongoing) n/a Yes 
Ethiopia/Eritrea 1999–2001 n/a Yes 
Gambia None 1994 Yes 
Guinea-Bissau 2012 (ongoing) 2012 Yes 
Guinea-Conakry None 2002 Yes 
Guinea-Conakry None 2008 Yes 
Liberia 2003 (ongoing) n/a Yes 
Libya 1 1992–2003 n/a Yes 
Madagascar None 2009 Yes 
Mali None 2012 Yes 
Mauritania None 2005 Yes 
Mauritania None 2008 Yes 
Niger None 2010 Yes 
Rwanda None 2012 Yes 
Sudan 2 (Darfur) 2005 (ongoing) n/a Yes 
Togo None 2005 Yes 
Zimbabwe None n/a Yes 
Total 8   22 
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The global–regional sanctions interface in Africa 
The key role of regional arrangements in ensuring the full implementation of UN sanctions has been 
acknowledged in the scholarly literature.37 What is often missed by observers is how often regional organizations 
prompt the UNSC to use its sanctioning tool. UN sanctions frequently endorse regional sanctions or other regional 
responses, such as peacekeeping missions, often at the instigation of these organizations.38 As Cortright, Gerber 
and Lopez suggest, when regional organizations take the lead in enacting sanctions, they aim to enlist the 
substantial resources and political clout of the UN to develop effective monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms.39 Some authors have pointed to this practice as reflecting the growing centrality of regional 
arrangements in global security governance. According to Bellamy and Williams, ‘regional arrangements 
influenc[e] which issues get debated in the Council [and] how they are framed’, thereby acting as ‘gatekeepers’ 
guiding discussion of the crisis in question.40 
Of the 43 African episodes of sanctions covered in the TSC dataset, regional organizations are involved in 41, that 
is, 95 per cent.41 In only a few episodes is no corresponding regional measure of some kind in place, whether 
peacekeeping, mediation or sanctions. If we look at the initiation of UNSC sanctions episodes, we observe that 
seven of the 14 first UNSC African episodes, representing half of the cases, were preceded by regional 
sanctions.42 Outside Africa, the figure is slightly less: four of the nine first non-African UNSC episodes, or 44 per 
cent of the cases, were preceded by regional sanctions.43 Countries outside Africa are more likely to be targeted 
instead with sanctions by an individual country, such as the United States, acting outside any regional 
arrangement. Indeed, seven of the first nine episodes of non-African sanctions were preceded by sanctions 
wielded unilaterally by an individual country.44 In contrast, only Libya 1 and 2 and Sudan 2 were subjected to 
unilateral sanctions prior to the UNSC measures, representing less than 7 per cent of the African cases.45 In 24 of 
the 43 African episodes, or 56 per cent, the UNSC is specifically signalling support to regional efforts or a 
neighbouring state.46 In most of these cases, the endorsement of regional sanctions by the UNSC acknowledges 
the efforts undertaken by the AU and/or ECOWAS to deal with the crisis at hand. In contrast, measures by 
regional arrangements outside Africa have been expressly mentioned in the text of UNSC resolutions in only 
three sanctions episodes (the former Yugoslavia 1 and 2, and Haiti), representing just 15 per cent of the total.47 It 
would seem, therefore, that the UNSC wishes to encourage African regional arrangements by means of the 
endorsement embodied in a sanctions resolution. 
Overall, a prior regional sanctions regime was in place for 29 of the 43 African UN sanctions episodes. In 16 of 
the UNSC episodes, TSC data indicate some involvement by ECOWAS.48 The AU was directly involved in 37 of 
the episodes, representing 86 per cent of the African cases.49 The EU is involved in 31 (49 per cent) of all the 
UNSC sanctions episodes.50 The only African UN sanctions which lack a regional precedent are those applied 
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against Angola, Rwanda, Liberia and Somalia—with the important qualification that ECOMOG and AMISOM, 
the first all-African peacekeeping missions, were already deployed in Liberia and Somalia respectively before 
UNSC action, so that even in these cases there was regional involvement ahead of UNSC measures. The cases of 
Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau and, very recently, the CAR are examples of the UNSC enacting measures in 
response to an unconstitutional change of government in direct support of regional efforts. 
 
The division of labour between the UN and regional organizations: changing patterns? 
Our enquiry shows that UN sanctions practice in Africa is overwhelmingly preoccupied with the continent's core 
problem: the incidence of violent conflict. The vast majority of sanctions episodes in Africa address situations of 
armed conflict, especially internal but also interstate. The fact that a majority of sanctions regimes address civil 
wars, rather than interstate conflicts as originally foreseen in the Charter, reflects how the UNSC has expanded its 
mandate.51 Among the several reasons for this expansion is the perceived need to address the principal source of 
insecurity on the continent. A further consideration is that civil wars have manifold regional ramifications and 
typically involve more than one country so that a conflict may become internationalized even in the absence of 
interstate war. This focus on conflict management is characteristic of Africa; UN sanctions regimes elsewhere aim 
at a greater diversity of goals. The fact that African targets register the highest number of episodes is a further 
indication of the sustained concern for the continent, given that every new episode entails a modification of the 
goals pursued and/or sanctions employed, and consequently reflects an effort to fine-tune the measures in place. 
UNSC sanctions in Africa are usually applied to one specific party to a conflict. Over one-fifth (21 per cent) of all 
sanctions in the continent were directed against rebel factions, and 35 per cent against the ‘entire’ government; 
seldom are ‘all parties to the conflict’ targeted, as is usually the case for non-African sanctions. This suggests the 
UNSC is making judgements about who are the peace spoilers. Regional sanctions tend to be similarly partial, the 
targets usually being the perpetrators of a coup or another type of unconstitutional change of government. 
The role of regional organizations in African sanctions is prominent, with some form of regional initiative 
recorded in almost every episode of UN sanctions in the continent. Regional arrangements have clearly embraced 
fully their function as conflict managers. As the Constitutive Act of the AU stipulates, ‘the scourge of conflicts in 
Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent’; it includes under this 
heading chiefly violent conflicts, but also terrorism, and even the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction in the 
case of South Africa during the Cold War. However, what is most remarkable about these regional arrangements 
is that their sanctions preceded UN sanctions in no fewer than half of the cases. This is significant on two counts. 
First, it differs from UN practice in other regions: while UN sanctions elsewhere are routinely preceded by other 
actors' sanctions regimes, these are mostly imposed by individual states acting unilaterally, rather than by regional 
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arrangements. This circumstance can be partly explained by the close relationship between the EU and Africa in 
the security domain.52 Second, this finding indicates that, by imposing sanctions, regional organizations are 
attracting the attention of the UNSC (especially the US, France and UK), which then follows up with its own 
measures. Indeed, the wielding of regional sanctions has often been accompanied by explicit calls for UN action, 
as in the cases of Sierra Leone, Libya 2 and Côte d'Ivoire.53 This suggests that regional organizations active in 
Africa are fulfilling the role that Chapter VIII of the UN Charter envisaged for them: that of attempting to solve 
security crises within their own regions by their own means. Only when their actions have proved insufficient do 
they make a strong case for UN involvement, and indeed their measures often give way to UNSC sanctions 
regimes. In following up on their measures, the UN supports regional organizations in their action. 
An interesting fact revealed by our data is that Washington often plays a key role in facilitating the adoption of 
regionally sponsored sanctions by the UNSC. Despite its lack of colonial history in Africa and the fact that it 
chairs none of the UNSC sanctions committees, the United States is the main ‘pen’ on many of the resolutions 
wielding UNSC sanctions in Africa. While media sources complain that the UNSC, and especially Washington, is 
not sufficiently active in Africa because of the continent's relative geopolitical unimportance, the record suggests 
otherwise. The role played by the United States in framing UNSC sanctions in Africa is in reality comparable to 
the attention paid by European states to their former colonies. The remarkable amount of attention the United 
States has paid to African regional arrangements can be interpreted as proof of US support for these organizations 
and recognition of their contribution to regional security. However, Washington's behaviour can also be read as 
the path of least resistance: since regional actions are unlikely to have any significant impact on North American 
interests, their efforts can be acknowledged at minimal cost. 
One of our most interesting findings on the ‘division of labour’ between regional arrangements and the UN 
concerns the practice of applying sanctions in support of democracy—an area in which regional arrangements 
have been exceptionally active. This pattern results from the felicitous affinity between the mandates of regional 
organizations in Africa and of the EU, which share similar objectives in terms of imposing sanctions to support 
democratic rule: both African bodies and the EU aim to reverse instances of unconstitutional power transfer, 
which most frequently take the form of coups d'état or refusal to recognize election results. Traditionally, the 
promotion of democracy and human rights has been the chief goal of EU sanctions in sub-Saharan Africa.54 This 
is now increasingly true of African regional organizations as well. As may be seen from tables 2–4, there is a 
considerable measure of overlap between sanctions imposed by the EU and those levied by the African 
arrangements. 
However, this presumed division of labour, under which the UN and regional organizations work together to deal 
with violent conflicts while only regional organizations are active in democracy support in Africa, is far from 
clear-cut. While the UN has acquired a number of democracy-supporting roles, manifested in the regular dispatch 
of electoral advisers and election monitoring missions, the UNSC does not normally apply sanctions in response 
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to unconstitutional changes of government. It has condemned such changes of government or refused to accept 
electoral results in 16 episodes, but normally stops short of taking action. As tables 2–4 show, plenty of instances 
of unconstitutional changes of government that have led to sanctions by regional organizations over the past 20 
years conspicuously failed to elicit any response from the UNSC. The Comoros, Egypt, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Guinea-Conakry, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Togo and Zimbabwe are all cases in point. 
That said, the recent UNSC sanctions package against Guinea-Bissau was intended to restore and consolidate 
democratic governance. The President of the Security Council, US Ambassador Susan Rice, declared that ‘the 
recurrence of illegal interference of the military in politics contributes to the persistence of instability and a 
culture of impunity, and hampers efforts towards consolidation of the rule of law … and entrenchment of a 
democratic culture’.55 This development is puzzling on several accounts. First, the UN Charter does not explicitly 
confer on the organization a responsibility to protect democratic rule; on the contrary, the coercive powers given 
to the UNSC refer specifically to the objective of ‘maintaining international peace and security’. Second, beyond 
the letter of the UN Charter, the promotion of democracy by the global organization is rendered unlikely by the 
lack of a universal agreement on the desirability of democratic rule over other forms of governance. Indeed, non-
democratic states are represented on the UNSC, including among its permanent members. 
As well as constituting the primary objective of the Guinea-Bissau episode, the consolidation of democratic rule 
features as a secondary objective in two other UN sanctions episodes, namely Sierra Leone in 1997 and Côte 
d'Ivoire in 2010. The UNSC has established a practice of citing references to the democracy instruments of 
regional organizations in its resolutions. In Sierra Leone, the UN applied an arms embargo and petroleum ban and 
a travel ban against the coup leaders, citing the measures adopted by ECOWAS and entrusting the regional 
organization with the implementation of the UN sanctions regime. The unanimously adopted resolution applying 
sanctions against the CAR bars a cadre from running for office ‘in accordance with the African Charter on 
Democracy, Elections and Governance, the Libreville Agreements, the relevant ECCAS56 decisions and the 
Constitutional Charter for the Transition’.57 What is more, the UNSC has also turned its attention to ‘good 
governance’ in numerous post-conflict situations (e.g. in Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire) by 
applying sanctions on exploitation of natural resources in order to encourage better national management 
strategies, thereby showing its willingness to seek secure and sustainable peace beyond the termination of 
hostilities. 
What has prompted the UNSC to enact sanctions to support democracy and good governance, notwithstanding the 
absence of a mandate to do so? Its imposition of sanctions on West African targets in response to interruptions of 
the democratic process recognizes the linkage between lack of democracy and the likelihood of eruption or 
recurrence of violent conflict. In other words, the UNSC appears to be making a particularly extensive 
interpretation of its mandate in order to address insecurity more effectively. Traditionally, the UNSC has been 
most creative in its application of sanctions in Africa; thus it is unsurprising that it continues innovating in its 
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most habitual ‘theatre’—and particularly in highly volatile countries where it has often had a previous presence 
on the ground. The new UN interest in supporting constitutional order, albeit still at an early stage, appears to 
acknowledge the transfer of power through unconstitutional means as a source of instability. Events in Sierra 
Leone epitomized how quickly a coup d'état can be followed by a descent into violence, in this case eventually 
leading to one of the cruellest African civil wars of its time. The fact that the UNSC seems to be adopting a 
practice of applying sanctions against the perpetrators of coups (even if only after regional arrangements have 
consolidated their role in rejecting unconstitutional transfers of power) points to a division of roles between the 
regional organization as precursor and the UNSC as a driver of innovation. The role of the UNSC appears to 
consist of providing a UN stamp for a practice first established by the regional arrangements, namely, the need to 
address the connection between an undemocratic change of government and the outbreak of conflict. 
 
Conclusions 
This article set out to map Africa's profile as the continent most frequently on the receiving end of UNSC 
sanctions, and to explore the interfaces between regional and UN sanctions and their mandates of conflict 
resolution and democracy promotion. The mapping exercise reveals that sanctions in Africa are characterized by 
features that set them apart from the rest of sanctions practice. UN sanctions against African targets tend to be 
protracted and subject to repeated revisions over their lifetime. Whereas non-African sanctions pursue a variety of 
goals, African UN sanctions are levied in support of the UNSC's primary objective of addressing conflict, mostly 
in the form of civil war. They tend to favour one party over another—sometimes the government, sometimes rebel 
forces. Interestingly, the UNSC's involvement in regional efforts to solve African conflicts is often prompted by 
Washington, followed closely by Paris in second place and London in third. 
The analysis finds close links between the regional and global levels. Half of the sanctions regimes initiated by 
the UNSC superseded regional sanctions, and in most of these cases the UNSC explicitly acknowledged the prior 
efforts of regional organizations to solve the crisis. Thus, regional organizations emerge as ‘pioneers’ of 
subsequent UNSC sanctions, to a larger extent than has been acknowledged in the literature so far. This suggests 
that the ‘division of labour’ in terms of crisis management is working as foreseen by the UN Charter in a 
considerable number of cases. The connection between regional and UN sanctions is also observable in terms of 
the objectives pursued. The analysis detects a high level of activity on the part of regional organizations not only 
in conflict resolution, but also in support of democratic rule. Here, however, the division of labour is not always 
as clear-cut as expected. Interestingly, the fact that some recent UN regimes have incorporated the goal of 
supporting democratic processes suggests that regional organizations are not only successful in stimulating action 
by the UNSC, but might even be in the process of ‘uploading’ to the UN level a novel goal: namely, the 
recognition of the relevance to security of consolidating democratic rule. Although it may be too early to tell, the 
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adoption of what seems to be a new aim in UNSC sanctions activity can be interpreted as an acknowledgement 
that conflict management in Africa is ultimately, and inextricably, connected with democratic consolidation. 
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